TR-2014002: Proof Complexity and Quantitative Epistemology by Novak, Natalia
City University of New York (CUNY)
CUNY Academic Works
Computer Science Technical Reports Graduate Center
2014
TR-2014002: Proof Complexity and Quantitative
Epistemology
Natalia Novak
Follow this and additional works at: http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_cs_tr
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Technical Report is brought to you by CUNY Academic Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Computer Science Technical Reports by an
authorized administrator of CUNY Academic Works. For more information, please contact AcademicWorks@gc.cuny.edu.
Recommended Citation
Novak, Natalia, "TR-2014002: Proof Complexity and Quantitative Epistemology" (2014). CUNY Academic Works.
http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_cs_tr/393
Proof Complexity and Quantitative Epistemology
Natalia Novak
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
Bronx Community College,
City University of New York
Bronx, NY 10043
natalia.novak@bcc.cuny.edu
January 9, 2014
Abstract
There is a famous epistemic Surprise Examination Paradox (SEP) which was studied
for at least half a century. We look at its formalization in MetaPRL logical framework
in order to see how the change in its dimensions affects the automatic proof search.
1 Introduction
There is a famous epistemic Surprise Examination Paradox (SEP): A professor tells
students in his class that there will be a surprise in-class exam during the next week.
There are 5 weekdays and class meets every day. Can the professor give an exam? We
assume that professor and students are truthful and smart. By the usual backward
induction argument, students figure that the exam cannot be given at all. Indeed, the
exam cannot be given at the last day, since it would not be a surprise. Therefore, the
exam cannot be given the day before, etc. The paradox occurs when the professor gives
an exam on day two, and it is a complete surprise for the students!
In the beginning of this article we present our own take on resolving the paradox. We
do not know if our suggestion was already considered by anybody, e.g. [Chow, 1998] has
12 pages of references on the subject, and it was not our goal to become experts in this
area. Further on, we provide the promised formalization of the paradox in MetaPRL.
In this formalization we take a conservative approach and simply prove that full set of
assumptions is contradictory or that the exam cannot happen on the last day of the
week.
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2 Our take on resolving the paradox
Consider a very trustful student who despite his or her intelligence is very confused on
the last day, if the test did not happen yet. He/she “knows” that professor never lies
or makes mistakes, and at the same time it looks like there is no alternative option and
exam has to happen on this last day. Any certain, positive or negative, answer to the
question “Do you think, that the test will happen today?” will lead to a contradiction.
Therefore, the natural answer is “I do not know”, which implies (just as negative
answer) that the student considers a possibility, that there will be no test. This implicit
additional outcome resolves the paradox.
3 Paradox formalization in MetaPRL
We work in S4J
n
, its implementation and automatic prover were described in [Bryukhov, 2006].
We use different agent indices to represent different time, and different students, if
needed. Knowledge relation between different moments of time for the same student
have to be explicitly stated for individual formulae, as S4J
n
has no built-in support for
time.
di means that the exam took place on ith day. For the case with one student, KiA
means that the student will know A just before day i. With this setup K1 has sligtly
special meaning, because it describes what we know up front about this puzzle.
3.1 2-day week
1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2))
2. K1(K2d1 ∨ K2¬d1)
3. K1¬K2d2
4. ¬K1d1
⊥
First assumption states that exam will happen on either of the days. Second assumption
states that after first day, it will be known if the exam took place already. Third
assumption is effectively our formalization of “surprise” - before second day we will not
know if the exam will happen on second day. And the last assumption is also “surprise”,
for the first day, this time. MetaPRL finds a proof for this theorem in a few seconds.
3.2 2-day week, many students
The same problem with 2 students is formulated trivially by duplicating relevant for-
mulas and replacing modality indices:
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1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2))
2. K1(K2d1orK2¬d1)
3. K1¬K2d2
4. ¬K1d1
5. K2(K3d1orK3¬d1)
6. K2¬K3d2
7. ¬K3d1
⊥
Extending this theorem for 40 students has some, but little effect on proof search timing,
still keeping it under one second; it seems to be linear or polynomial of low degree. This
is expected, as conclusion of the theorem is independent from the number of students,
and first 4 assumptions are sufficient anyway.
3.3 3-day week
1. J ((d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ ¬d3) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ d2 ∧ ¬d3) ∨ (¬d1 ∧ ¬d2 ∧ d3))
2. J(K2d1 ∨ K2¬d1)
3. J(K3d1 ∨ K3¬d1)
4. J(K3d2 ∨ K3¬d2)
5. K1¬K2d2
6. K1¬K3d3
7. K2¬K3d3
8. ¬K1d1
¬d3
First assumption states that exam will happen on either of the days. 2nd, 3rd and 4th
assumptions say that we know results of previous days. 5th to 8th assumptions are
“surprise” conditions.
Note that this theorem only states the impossibility of the exam on the last day of the
week and does not involve backward induction. So this is a simplified version, basically
first step in establishing the paradox.
If we unfold all disjunctions, MetaPRL has no problems completing the proof. But it
could not find the proof in fully automatic mode in an hour. In this sense, this theorem
is harder than Muddy Children puzzle for 4 children, which can be solved in 150-250sec.
The reason why fully automatic mode fails is because all J-boxed assumptions have to
be used twice in the reasoning and the way prover works is that it first exhaust all proof
matrices with modalities used at most once, then expands the search space by allowing
each modality to have two prefix interpretations; the resulting search space is big and
solution does not show up quickly. Muddy children puzzle also needs this search space
expansion, but we get more luck there, it is not clear why exactly.
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Muddy Children puzzle for 4 children can be sped up by an order of magnitude by
manually duplicating assumptions that will be used twice in the reasoning and avoiding
automatic expansion of all modalities. We tried to apply the same technique to our
problem at hand but it produced too big of a search space, and the search simply did
not finish within a reasonable time.
Originally, we wanted to see how S4J
n
-to-S4nLP realization procedure [Novak, 2009]
performs on proofs of Surprise Exam paradox for different number of days, but the
current implementation of the realization procedure supports only proofs generated fully
automatically. Extention of the current implementation of this procedure to manually
constructed proofs is not exactly trivial. S4J
n
prover and S4nLP realizer communicate via
a custom proof format, independent ofMetaPRL proof format, hence convenient support
for manually provided proofs will amount to implementing a small proof assistant just
for S4J
n
, which falls outside of the scope of this effort.
4 Conclusion
Initially, our intention was to apply the S4nLP realization procedure to proofs of SEP
with different number of days and different number of students, to estimate the empirical
complexity of our implementation of the procedure.
It turned out, that it is possible to get an automatically generated proof of SEP for
2-day week, for one student and for many students cases. Changing the number of
students does not affect the proof search time too much. Application of the realization
algorithm took a few seconds, and proof term size does not change with the number of
students. 3-day week with one student case changes the situation dramatically. Even
after an hour the prover could not find a proof, and a few technical tricks did not
help. At the same time, it did not take much time to find the proof interactively, by
eliminating all boxed disjunctions and applying automatic prover to resulting subgoals.
This does not allow us to compare the conversion time and the proof-terms length, since
the current implementation of the relization procedure supports only automatically
generated proofs.
5 Future Work
Considering the complications that were met in this project, it will be very instumental
to modify or extend the current implementation of S4nLP realizer to accept manually
generated proofs, which will allow to do the comparisons we are eager to get.
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